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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) for mathematical realism on the 
basis of the indispensable role mathematics plays in scientific explanations of physical facts, along with various re-
sponses to it. I argue that there is an analogue of causal explanation for mathematics which, of several basic types 
of explanation, holds the most promise for use in the EIA. I consider a plausible case where mathematics plays an 
explanatory role in this sense, but argue that such use still does not support realism about mathematical objects.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza la versión ‘mejorada’ del argumento de la indispensabilidad (EIA) de Baker y varias de las 
respuestas que ha recibido. Este argumento pretende establecer el realismo matemático en virtud del papel indis-
pensable que las matemáticas juegan en las explicaciones científicas de los hechos físicos. Argumento que hay un 
análogo de explicación causal para las matemáticas que, de los varios sentidos básicos de explicación, parece el más 
adecuado para el EIA. Analizo un caso plausible en el que las matemáticas juegan un papel explicativo en este sen-
tido, pero concluyo que este uso no es suficiente para establecer el realismo acerca de los objetos matemáticos.
Palabras clave: indispensabilidad, explicación, realismo, estructuralismo.
Introduction
The so-called ‘Quine/Putnam indispensability argument’ has been discussed over the past 
half century as the main impediment to mathematical antirealism. Although they are of-
ten lumped together, the arguments given by Quine and Putnam are significantly differ-
ent.1 Quine’s argument depends upon his controversial claim of confirmational holism, 
and concludes that given the use of mathematics in our best (and well-confirmed) scien-
tific theories, we must accept the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam’s argument, by 
contrast, emphasizes the use of mathematics in formulating physical theories that he thinks 
(in accordance with scientific realism) we have reason to regard as true. Putnam’s claim, 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented in November 2016 at the workshop “Updating Indis-
pensabilities:  Hilary Putnam in Memoriam”. I want to thank the audience for their helpful comments 
on my paper.  I especially want to thank Concha Martínez Vidal and the editor, María José García-
Encinas, for their kind support.
1 A number of crucial differences are noted in (Vineberg 1998). Colyvan (Colyvan 2015) presents a ver-
sion of the argument he identifies as ‘The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument’, but also notes 
that Quine and Putnam gave different arguments. (Quine 1961a, 1961b, 1976, 1969) (Putnam 1979a, 
1979b)
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that the indispensable use of mathematics in formulating statements of physical theory that 
are taken as true requires accepting the mathematics so used, has generally been read as car-
rying a commitment to the existence of mathematical objects as in Quine, and so, at least 
in broad outline, the arguments of Quine and Putnam have been taken to have much the 
same core. Nonetheless, Putnam makes clear that he regards his indispensability argument 
as one for the truth of mathematical claims, but not for traditional Platonism about math-
ematical objects (Putnam 2012).
More recently, Baker has presented and defended what he calls an ‘enhanced’ indis-
pensability argument (EIA) for the existence of mathematical objects that stems from the 
use of mathematics in explaining physical facts (Baker 2009). I begin with a discussion of 
this version of the indispensability argument and its presuppositions, along with ways of 
responding to it and their relative merits. This sets up the main focus of the paper, which 
concerns how mathematics figures in explaining physical facts and whether mathemati-
cal claims should thereby be accepted. Different ways in which explanation could be un-
derstood in Baker’s argument are considered, with a focus on their potential to support 
inference to the existence of mathematical objects. I explore the idea that a kind of expla-
nation that is analogous to causal explanation might serve this function, and consider in 
broad outline how explanation along these lines functions both within mathematics and 
in explaining physical facts by focusing on the famous problem of the Seven Bridges of 
K önigsberg. This leads to a suggestion about how mathematics can explain physical facts 
without embracing the realism about mathematical objects that the indispensability argu-
ment is typically invoked to support.
Baker’s indispensability argument and strategies of response
Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument (EIA) is similar to those of Quine and 
Putnam, but intended to complement them by focusing on the apparent explanatory role 
of mathematics in science:2
1. We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an indispen-
sable explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
2. Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science.
3. Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects. 
(Baker 2009)
This argument is valid, so any quarrel must rest with the premises. One way of resisting the 
conclusion denies that explanation is tied to belief as required by (1). For Baker (1) derives 
from the Principle of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), which he holds as a basic 
tenet of scientific realism. However, many forms of scientific realism reject the idea that we 
must accept a literal reading of all claims figuring in scientific explanations and also reject 
that we must accept the existence of every object mentioned in those explanations. Accord-
ingly, at least some qualification of (1) is an option.
Several programs developed in response to Quine and Putnam’s versions of the in-
dispensability argument, if successful, allow resisting Baker’s EIA by opposing (2). Most 
2 This apparent explanatory role is discussed by Field (Field 1989).
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prominently, Field tries to show that physical theories can be replaced by nominalized ver-
sions that quantify only over physical objects and relations to establish that mathemat-
ics is dispensable in formulating physical theory (Field 1980). However, Baker thinks that 
Field’s nominalization program cannot be successfully carried out, and that there are indis-
pensable uses of mathematics in explaining physical facts. These include his explanation in 
support of premise (2) of why the cicadas of the genus Magicica in a particular region have 
prime (17-year) life cycles:
E1. Having a life-cycle period that minimizes intersection with other (nearby/lower) 
periods is evolutionarily advantageous.
E2. Prime periods minimize intersection.
E3. Hence, organisms with periodic life cycles are likely to evolve periods that are 
prime.
E4. Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited by biological constraints to periods from 
14 to 18 years.
E5. Hence, cicadas in ecosystem-type E are likely to evolve 17-year periods.
Baker regards E1-E5 as a mathematical explanation of the fact
E*. Cicadas in ecosystem-type E have a life cycle of 17 years. (Baker 2005)
Other alleged mathematical explanations of physical facts include explanations of the di-
vision of honeycombs into hexagonal cells and the impossibility of a continuous walk over 
the Seven Bridges of Königsberg.
Such examples raise many questions, including the precise role that mathematical ob-
jects play in providing explanations of physical facts. One response to Baker’s cicada exam-
ple is that the mathematics is dispensable in that reference to mathematical objects can be 
eliminated in the explanation of E*, or at least avoided in a closely related explanation of it. 
Saatsi provides such an alternative explanation by replacing E2-3 with the claim that for pe-
riods in the range 14-18 years the intersection minimizing period is 17, where this is to be 
understood as a claim about durations rather than number (Saatsi 2011).
However, Baker replies that his mathematical explanation is more general and unified, 
and so superior to such alternatives that attempt to dispense with mathematics (Baker 2017). 
IBE then sanctions accepting his mathematical explanation, and with it mathematical objects.
Baker’s reasoning raises questions concerning IBE, as to the appropriate criteria for 
the best explanation, whether by those criteria his explanation is the best, and whether this 
supports realism about mathematical objects. Advocates of IBE cite various virtues, often 
including generality, simplicity, and unity, but this leaves open the precise form of these 
theoretical features that is associated with explanatory power. Predictive power and ac-
commodation of known data are sometimes regarded as important features of scientific ex-
planation, whereas minimality may be considered a metaphysical virtue. In particular, for 
Field, nominalized versions of physical theory are superior to those formulated mathemati-
cally in that they avoid the misleading appearance that the physical facts depend upon non-
physical facts (Field 1989).
IBE is notoriously vague and just how such dimensions of goodness are to be weighted 
remains unclear. Beyond the problem of resolving these issues with IBE, Field’s program 
faces the disadvantage that the mathematics used in describing or explaining physical facts 
must be replaced with domain specific predicates, and is thus a piecemeal and open-ended 
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project. Even if mathematics is dispensable to the (best) explanation of the cicada life-cy-
cle, it may not be dispensable to the best explanations of other facts, since it is unclear that 
minimality, or some other virtue(s) of explanations that dispense with mathematics, will 
dominate over other merits in every case.
Other antirealist responses to the EIA avoid having to show that mathematics is dis-
pensable in physical explanations by arguing that mathematical claims don’t carry with 
them a commitment to abstract mathematical objects. One approach tries to show that 
mathematical truths can be understood as modal claims of possibility rather than about ex-
isting abstract objects.3 Baker does not address such projects in conjunction with the EIA, 
but his response to Field-style attempts to reformulate the alleged mathematical explana-
tions of physical facts to remove mathematical terms suggests the position that casting the 
mathematical claims that figure in those explanations in modal terms involves giving more 
complex and thus inferior explanations. Although antirealists who invoke modality in un-
derstanding mathematical truth have grounds to dispute a rebuttal along these lines, a more 
direct response to Baker’s argument that avoids the details of such programs is desirable.
Wakil and Justus do respond more directly against Baker’s EIA by arguing that he pro-
vides the wrong sort of explanation of E* (Wakil & Justus 2017). They claim that his math-
ematical explanation of why such species evolved to have 17-year life-cycles errs in suppos-
ing that this trait occurred because it was selected for. Instead they suggest a different kind 
of explanation that does not appeal to mathematics, which, unlike Saatsi’s alternative, does 
not merely try to dispense with the reference to mathematical objects in Baker’s explana-
tion. However, their response again follows a piecemeal approach; and, they admit that 
there appear to be other cases in which mathematics plays an indispensable explanatory 
role, making this an inadequate reply to the EIA generally.
In contrast to the responses to the EIA noted above, I focus here on the concept of ex-
planation in accounting for physical facts and the conditions under which an explanation, 
or a portion thereof, provides grounds for inference. I argue that even given the sort of ex-
planation most favorable to such inference, typical explanations of physical facts involving 
mathematics do not commit us to mathematical objects. As such the position will be con-
sistent with antirealist views that understand mathematical truths as modal claims of possi-
bility, in line with the suggestion of Putnam (2012), and the accounts proposed by Chihara 
(1990) and Hellman (1989).
Explanation and inference
As discussed, Baker’s EIA turns on the idea that mathematical objects play a role in the best 
explanation of some physical facts and that this compels at least scientific realists to accept 
such objects in accordance with IBE. The claim that one ought to infer to the best explana-
tion of a given fact presupposes both that there are grounds for taking an explanation of it 
as best and that having this status as the best explanation warrants belief or acceptance. De-
spite the prevalence of appeals to IBE, precisely what such grounds amount to, and the ex-
tent to which they license inference, remains unclear and controversial. Adding to the dif-
3 Putnam suggests such a view in various places as noted in (Putnam 2012). For detailed positions of this 
sort see (Chihara 1990) and (Hellman 1989). 
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ficulty is that what constitutes an explanation is itself unclear. Indeed, it is plausible that 
there are distinct notions of explanation, each with their own measures of assessment, 
whose domains overlap at least to some extent,4 which looks to complicate claims about 
what is to be inferred on explanatory grounds.
Connected with the problem of characterizing explanations and comparing them is 
that of determining exactly what it is that is doing the explaining and might be held to be 
accepted on this basis. Clearly it is not sufficient for the claim that mathematics explains 
a physical fact that mathematics is used or appealed to in some way in the explanation. 
Many scientific explanations invoke laws that are stated using mathematics, but this does 
not make such explanations mathematical. Mathematics may also be used in deriving con-
sequences of laws in an explanation, but again this does not make the explanation math-
ematical. Rather, a mathematical explanation of a physical fact must somehow turn upon 
a mathematical fact; the mathematics cannot be simply a mechanism for conveying the ex-
planation of the physical fact.5 An account of explanation appropriate for the EIA should 
facilitate showing how a given explanation is genuinely mathematical.
Despite the fact that various different accounts of explanation have been proposed and 
a number of distinct virtues suggested as contributing to explanatory power, which make 
appeals to IBE in the EIA appear difficult to assess, many particular ideas about explana-
tion may be thought of as falling under one of several basic conceptions of explanation. Of 
these, I suggest that only one is a basic tenet of scientific realism and might be held to func-
tion in a non-question-begging way in the EIA.
Where explanation is construed as providing understanding, an explanation may be 
taken as making plain and/or reducing the phenomena to be explained to common or famil-
iar terms. This sort of explanation is important in conveying scientific ideas to non-experts, 
but is not in line with the fundamental understanding sought by science, which provides deep 
and novel explanations in what were previously unfamiliar terms. It is further doubtful that 
this sense of explanation supports IBE as required by the EIA. Quine did list familiarity of 
principle as a theoretical virtue that supports theory acceptance (Quine 1976); however, sci-
entific practice suggests that making use of familiar principles is better taken as a guideline for 
extending what are already well-confirmed scientific theories to account for phenomena in 
their domain than as a reason for favoring theories that have yet to be established.
A broad view of scientific explanation, beginning with Hempel, who took explanations 
to be arguments, is that it involves assimilation of a fact to a general pattern or regularity. Bak-
er’s emphasis on generality and the fact that in defending his ‘mathematical explanation’ of 
the cicada’s 17-year life cycle he presents the explanation as an argument in much the style of 
Hempel suggests a conception of explanation along these lines. However, Hempel’s particular 
account of scientific explanation, whereupon scientific explanations involve deductions from 
laws, cannot be satisfactorily modified to cover mathematical explanation. Instead, Kitch-
er’s unification theory (Kitcher 1989), which, with Hempel, links explanations with gener-
ality and argument,6 appears more promising as having the potential to apply to mathemati-
4 A case for this is made in (Salmon 1989).
5 Lange discusses these points in (Lange 2013), adding that what he calls distinctively mathematical ex-
planations of physical facts involve a deeper sort of necessity than mere physical necessity. 
6 See Salmon (1989). 
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cal explanations of physical facts while conforming with Baker’s assertions about explanation. 
Kitcher’s theory takes explanation to consist in unifying a body of facts through their deriva-
tion from a small set of restricted patterns of argument, with greater unification achieved by 
using fewer and more restricted (stringent) argument patterns. Baker’s claim that his explana-
tion of the prime life cycle of the 17-year cicada is more general than Saatsi’s fits with this idea 
in that Baker can make use of a more restricted pattern of argument than Saatsi in deriving 
the periods of other species of cicada with different prime life-cycles.
Although Kitcher’s unification theory of explanation fits well with Baker’s apparent 
views about scientific explanation, the unification theory faces various problems,7 and is 
unsuitable in arguing for mathematical realism via the EIA. There is little agreement, even 
among scientific realists, that the greater generality, unification or simplicity of a proposed 
explanation makes it more likely to be true. Many scientific realists reject the broad accept-
ability of IBE, particularly where generality, unification, and/or simplicity figure as pivotal 
in determining the best explanation, even where the inference concerns the existence and 
properties of physical objects. To suppose that scientific realism is committed, over and 
above using the principle in making inferences about physical objects, to a broader princi-
ple covering mathematical objects referenced in an explanation of physical fact that counts 
as best on grounds of generality, unification, and /or simplicity is question begging.8
Some realists who reject IBE in general, nonetheless accept (and/or require) a re-
stricted version of the principle. Notably Cartwright has argued that scientists do accept 
inference to the most probable cause (Cartwright 1983). Whether or not it is correct that 
scientists do so reason, it is central to many versions of scientific realism that, at least under 
certain conditions, those objects that figure as the causes in the best causal explanations of 
observed phenomena are to be accepted. Such acceptance appears grounded in the idea that 
there are some underlying properties of physical objects that bring about the observed facts, 
and that the success of scientific methodology in predicting and controlling empirical phe-
nomena is to be accounted for in terms of tracking its causes.
Taking scientific realism as adhering to a restricted principle of IBE in which we in-
fer to the most probable cause, while less controversial in requiring only that we accept the 
best causal explanation of a given empirical fact, initially seems unhelpful for the EIA, since 
mathematical objects, on virtually every account, are causally inert. This would be right if 
scientific realism employs only a very narrow version of IBE in which we accept the exist-
ence of the physical objects that figure in the best causal explanation of the phenomena. 
Instead scientific realism might embrace a still restricted but somewhat broader principle 
according to which we are to accept the conditions upon which the phenomena depend, 
where such dependence need not be strictly causal. Some scientific realists, along with 
antirealists, will reject the broader principle as contentious, but a principle of at least this 
strength appears required for the EIA. The issue here is whether the EIA succeeds given 
the stronger principle. Towards this possibility, I suggest that there is a partial analogue of 
causal explanation that applies to mathematics. Although this analogue helps to illuminate 
7 See Woodward (2014).
8 The fact that it is question begging to take what would be a unifying explanation if true to be a reason 
to accept a given explanation as true does not count against the unification theory of explanation per 
se as an account of what an explanation from previously accepted facts may consist in.
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how mathematics works in the explanation of certain physical facts, ultimately it does not 
support acceptance of mathematical objects as needed for the indispensability argument.
Analogues of causal explanation in mathematics
Many scientific explanations are considered causal, although there has been some disagree-
ment as to the form (or forms) that such explanation can take. Salmon wrote of causal ex-
planation in terms of locating the underlying mechanism that brings about the fact to be ex-
plained. More recently, Woodward has emphasized the idea that “(causal) explanation is a 
matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual dependence” (Woodward 2003, 
191), with such patterns describing how things would be different under alternative condi-
tions. A key feature of this view is that a causal explanation of a fact is associated with the con-
ditions that make a difference to whether the fact occurs, where such difference makers can be 
exhibited through interventions. In considering causal explanation proper, mechanisms and 
interventions are understood as physical processes, and as such do not belong to mathematics 
and do not figure in mathematical explanation, but both mechanisms and interventions have 
something of an analogue in mathematics. Moreover, both conceptions of causal explanation 
belong to a more general idea that to explain is to give the reason for the fact, locate its source, 
or find the conditions upon which it depends. It is particularly significant here that the iden-
tification of difference makers appears tied to certain mathematical explanations, which sug-
gests that these explanations are analogous, in some ways, to causal explanations. I examine 
this idea and then indicate how this permits us to see how mathematics can be taken in some 
cases as explaining physical fact without a commitment to mathematical realism.
Mathematical explanation and difference makers
To show how there can be a kind of mathematical explanation of a physical fact that paral-
lels causal explanation, it will be useful to focus attention on the solution to the problem of 
the Seven Bridges of Königsberg. The problem concerns whether it is possible to walk in a 
continuous path over each of the seven bridges of old Königsberg, crossing over each bridge 
only once.
Fig. 1
Schematic diagram of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg
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Euler established that this is impossible by associating a graph with the configuration of 
bridges in which each landmass is replaced by a point (also node or vertex) and the bridges 
connecting them by lines (or edges). The resulting Seven Bridges graph corresponds to the 
physical arrangement of landmasses and bridges, and gives rise to a mathematical problem 
about whether there is a continuous path (or Eulerian path) traversing the graph that cov-
ers each edge only once.
Fig. 2
Diagram of Bridges of Königsberg and the Seven Bridges graph with points on each landmass 
and edges representing bridges
Euler argued that there can be no such path, for in the Seven Bridges graph each point 
touches an odd number of edges. Any continuous path covering each line segment of the 
graph only once contains one starting point and one end point (possibly the same as the 
starting point). A starting or end point may touch an odd number of edges. But each non-
starting point must touch an even number of edges so that once a path touches a point via 
an edge, there is a new edge, not previously traversed by the path, from which to exit. Since 
the Seven Bridges graph contains more than two points touching an odd number of edges, 
there is no continuous path through the Seven Bridges graph traversing each edge only 
once.
In constructing the Seven Bridges graph, which represents the structure of the physi-
cal arrangement of bridges, Euler passes from a physical problem to one of pure mathematics 
concerning the associated graph. His solution to the mathematical problem proceeds by the 
argument above concerning possible paths over the edges of the graph and passing through 
the vertices. Importantly, Euler’s argument provides an internal mathematical explanation 
for why there is no path through the Seven Bridges graph and plausibly also gives us a math-
ematical explanation of the physical fact that it is impossible for someone to take a walk that 
crosses over each bridge only once. Here the features of the internal mathematical argu-
ment account for how it explains the mathematical fact, but also suggest how the argument 
can provide a mathematical explanation of the physical impossibility of a continuous walk 
across the Seven Bridges of Königsberg. I first discuss the idea that Euler provided an inter-
nal mathematical explanation, which bears a similarity to causal explanations, and then take 
up the implications for mathematical explanations of physical facts and the EIA.
How Euler’s proof explains the impossibility of a continuous walk may be seen by first 
contrasting the proof with one that does not explain this fact. An inelegant proof by brute 
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force can be given by considering each possible starting point and showing that each par-
tial path beginning with the point cannot be completed by following it until arriving at a 
point from which the path cannot be continued without re-crossing an edge. This argu-
ment establishes the result, but does not explain why there is no Eulerian path through the 
Seven Bridges graph, leaving us to account for the difference between the two proofs. One 
suggestion is that Euler’s proof is somehow more general; however, both proofs cover only 
the Seven Bridges graph. However, Euler’s argument is immediately generalizable to other 
graphs and in so doing establishes that any graph with more than two points touching an 
odd number of edges contains no continuous path. This suggests focusing on the general-
izability of a proof, rather than on whether it has been so generalized. However, generaliz-
ability per se is insufficient to distinguish the two proofs, for the brute force proof can also 
be generalized.
Instead of considering generalizability there is another facet of Euler’s proof that 
does distinguish it from the brute force proof and is plausibly its key explanatory feature. 
Namely, the proof exhibits, and argues from, those features of the graph that make a dif-
ference to the existence of an Eulerian path. In particular, the completion of such a path 
depends upon having no more than two points touching an odd number of line segments. 
A general (or generalizable proof) need not involve locating such difference-makers (al-
though many do), and so the conception of explanation that involves the identification of 
difference-makers does not reduce to that of generality within mathematics. The fact that 
Euler’s proof stems from locating those factors that make a difference to the possibility of 
a continuous path further distinguishes it from the brute force proof. This suggests that, as 
with causal explanations on Woodward’s account, Euler’s graph theoretic proof explains 
through identifying the relevant features of counterfactual dependence.
The idea that there are mathematical proofs that proceed through identifying dif-
ference-makers, and thus that there is something of an analogue of causal explanation in 
mathematics, is related to the view of Steiner in an early paper on mathematical explana-
tion. Steiner’s idea is that explanatory proofs make reference to what he terms a character-
izing property of an object or structure mentioned in the theorem, where substituting a dif-
ferent object from the same domain results in the collapse of the theorem (Steiner 1978). 
It is clear that on his view explanatory proofs, of which he gives various examples many of 
which are not the most general, involve identifying difference makers linked with condi-
tions of counterfactual dependence. Steiner took explanatory proofs in general to have this 
feature, although the essential claim here is just that Euler’s proof is an explanatory proof 
with these features and that there is a broad class of other explanatory proofs within math-
ematics that do also, regardless of whether all explanatory proofs have this similarity with 
causal explanations.
The link observed here between explanatory proofs and the identification of certain 
conditions of counterfactual dependence leaves much unsettled about just how both in-
ternal mathematical explanations and mathematical explanations of physical facts com-
pare with causal explanations proper. Note first that Steiner’s account is incomplete in 
that he leaves the notion of a characterizing property unanalyzed. Still individual graphs 
can clearly be characterized by the arrangement of their nodes and edges. The existence of 
a continuous path depends upon having an arrangement where no more than two nodes 
touch an odd number of edges, so that Euler’s argument meets Steiner’s condition for an 
explanatory proof. Still, seeing that this and other cases fit Steiner’s account leaves open 
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the extent to which it is, or is not, analogous to particular conceptions of causal explana-
tion proper.
Explanation of a fact on Woodward’s view involves both an explanatory generaliza-
tion providing counterfactual information and a specification of the variables involved 
in the generalization as it applies to the explanation. Central to his idea of causal explana-
tions is that the explanatory generalization remain invariant under interventions to such 
variables appearing in the explanans. Importantly, deeper generalizations are associated 
with broader explanatory generalizations. In a recent paper, Jansson and Saatsi (Jansson & 
Saatsi 2017) sketch how the general features of Woodward’s account can be applied in ex-
plaining why there is no continuous walk over the Seven Bridges of Königsberg and to re-
lated configurations of islands and bridges. They classify various limited configurations of 
islands and bridges, involving limits on the number of islands and bridges, into whether 
they include islands connected by an odd number of bridges or not (note that they under-
stand the general problem to be one of tourability, which involves returning to the initial 
starting point to the conclude the walk, rather than merely traversing each edge in a con-
tinuous path). In accordance with Woodward’s framework, they provide a generalization 
for various limited configurations of bridges that relates whether the configuration is odd 
or even to its tourability. Even configurations correspond to a variable that yields an out-
put corresponding to tourability and odd configurations correspond to a variable that 
yields a value corresponding to no tourability. In their treatment invariant generalizations 
that cover more arrangements of islands and bridges are considered more general and pro-
vide deeper explanations, with the broadest possible case invoking the mathematical ob-
jects of graph theory.
In addition to trying to show how an explanation of the impossibility of a walk over 
the Seven Bridges of Königsberg may be said to be akin to causal explanation by applying 
Woodward’s account, Jansson and Saatsi here continue with Saatsi’s earlier project of at-
tempting to show that mathematics is dispensable, for the explanation of the tourability/
nontourability of any particular configuration of islands and bridges (or collection of such 
configurations) can be given without reference to the objects of graph theory. Thus their 
recent development along Woodwardian lines retains the claim that mathematical objects 
are dispensable in the explanation of physical fact and that it is physical structure, rather 
than mathematics, that does the explaining.
Jansson and Saatsi’s development bolsters the idea that at least certain mathematical 
explanations work by exhibiting counterfactual dependencies, and in this way at least are 
analogous to causal explanations. However, their account involves a discontinuity between 
what they take as the non-mathematical explanation of the nontourability of the Seven 
Bridges of Königsberg provided by considering classes of physical island and bridge struc-
tures and the mathematical explanation from graph theory. Furthermore, there is some 
question about whether their understanding of interventions requires giving up the idea 
that each of these explanations is essentially causal. This is particularly acute in the math-
ematical case where it is unclear how interventions are to be understood. As Pincock points 
out (Pincock 2015), Woodward requires that causal explanations answering the questions 
of counterfactual dependence must do so in terms of interventions, where the intervention 
would be made to the object that figures in the explanandum. That is, such explanations re-
quire invariance under interventions to the object of the explanandum. Jansson and Saatsi 
instead allow interventions to apply to objects of the same type. This also fits with Steiner’s 
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account upon which we are to consider the resulting theorem upon substitutions of objects 
of the same type. One possibility for accommodating Jansson and Saatsi’s treatment is to 
broaden Woodward’s concept of intervention, and with it casual explanations. This might 
be done by counting substitutions of objects of another type as interventions, but another 
possibility with some promise for understanding interventions in mathematics is to take 
them as involving transformations applied to mathematical objects. One could then take 
interventions to be made on the very object mentioned in the explanandum, with the idea 
that maintaining invariance would require certain limitations on the allowable transforma-
tions. An alternative is to maintain the restriction on causal explanations and simply allow 
that mathematical explanations may involve a different (non-causal) type of counterfactual 
dependence. The issues about how to understand causal explanation and its connection 
with interventions, as well as the extent to which certain mathematical explanations may 
be regarded as causal, are complex. But what matters for the purpose of addressing the EIA 
is the idea that mathematical explanations such as that of the impossibility of a continuous 
walk over the Seven Bridges of Königsberg appeal to a kind of mathematical dependence, 
regardless of whether this is to be understood as causal in Woodward’s sense.
The role of mathematics in explaining physical facts
Given the suggestion that there is something of an analogue of causal explanation within 
mathematics that involves identifying difference makers, I turn to how such mathematical 
difference makers play a role in explaining physical facts and whether this provides reason 
to accept mathematical objects, focusing as before on the problem of the Seven Bridges of 
Königsberg. For Baker the appeal to the graph in Euler’s solution is part of the best expla-
nation of the physical fact and thus requires accepting the mathematics so involved, in par-
allel with his reasoning in his cicada example. But recall that the mere use of mathematics 
in the explanation of a physical fact, including use in representing the physical scenario in-
volved in that explanation, does not make the explanation mathematical. Establishing that 
some mathematical fact explains a physical one requires a reason to take the latter to de-
pend upon the mathematical fact. Saatsi appears to hold that the physical fact does not de-
pend upon a mathematical fact, because the impossibility of a continuous walk does not de-
pend upon the existence of mathematical objects. Although in his paper with Jansson it is 
suggested that the deepest explanation in one sense is provided by invoking graph theory, 
and thus mathematical objects, the particular fact is nevertheless explained in Woodward-
ian style without invoking graph theoretic objects by means of more limited generalizations 
holding of physical structures alone. The view seems to be that the physical impossibil-
ity does not depend upon a purely mathematical fact, but that mathematics merely plays a 
representational role by providing a general explanatory framework where this does not re-
quire the acceptance of mathematical objects. The rejoinder for Baker is that the best expla-
nation requires mathematical objects, and so we should accept them. I suggest that a third 
view avoids this impasse.
There is a case to be made that the impossibility of a continuous walk over the Seven 
Bridges depends upon the mathematical impossibility established by Euler’s graph theo-
retic proof and that his explanatory proof, which locates the relevant mathematical differ-
ence-makers, indicates how the physical fact may be said to depend upon the mathemati-
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cal one, while still not requiring the acceptance of mathematical objects. Observe first that 
what matters to the impossibility of a path over the Seven Bridges graph is the structural 
relationship of the points and edges. It is not any property of the points or edges that are 
the difference-makers to the impossibility of a continuous path, nor does such an impos-
sibility appear to depend upon the existence of the particular graph itself. The difference-
makers do not consist in the features of the individual nodes and edges, but in their rela-
tional structure. The role of these objects is to provide a framework to characterize that 
structure. Accordingly, the fact that there is no possible path through the graph, does not 
appear to depend upon the existence of the graph, but only upon the relationships between 
the points and edges were the relations of the graph to be realized. Insofar as the graph itself 
plays an explanatory role which accounts for the physical facts, the thought is that it is the 
structural dependencies revealed by the graph that explain those facts rather than the exist-
ence of mathematical objects.
The question that remains is whether the structural dependences depicted by the graph 
as used in accounting for the physical fact should be taken as mathematical. Euler’s use of 
the Seven Bridges graph is an example of what Pincock calls an abstract explanation, in that 
it involves a classification of systems that appeals to a more abstract entity that is linked to 
the phenomena to be explained (Pincock 2015, pg. 867). The entity here is a mathematical 
one, and so for Pincock yields a mathematical explanation. By contrast, Jansson and Saatsi 
do not take the use of mathematics as providing a special sort of explanation; rather, they 
view many ordinary cases of causal explanation in science as more or less abstract, but not 
thereby mathematical. Considering arrangements of bridges involves abstraction on their 
view, but mathematics only enters when the description involves explicit mathematical ob-
jects, such as graphs with their nodes and edges.
It is clear if we consider the arrangement of landmasses and bridges found in the original 
bridges of Königsberg along with the graph that we can apply Euler’s argument using the lat-
ter to the physical arrangement directly. Indeed, there is a sense in which the same argument 
is applied to the arrangement of landmasses and bridges as to the arrangement of nodes and 
edges in the connected graph. Whereas this might be taken as evidence that the explanation 
of the impossibility of a continuous walk is physical rather than mathematical,9 I suggest in-
stead that the structural relationships that are appealed to in the physical arrangement might 
be seen as mathematical. This corresponds to a structuralist view on which mathematics is 
concerned with spatial relations, shape, quantity, order, etc., and that doing mathematics in-
volves reasoning about such concepts in accordance with certain methods.
It is common to conceive of mathematics as consisting of theories of numbers, sets, var-
ious geometric objects, and so on. Instead for the structuralist, mathematics is concerned 
with the relations that hold between objects in structures; it is the relational features be-
tween the objects referenced in the structure that they seek to describe. In any particular 
instance of the structure, the objects that appear are place-holders in the structure, rather 
than the subject matter of interest. This structuralist interpretation of mathematics allows 
for the view that mathematics plays a genuinely explanatory, rather than a merely represen-
tational, role in accounting for such facts as the impossibility of a continuous walk over the 
Seven Bridges of Königsberg.
9 The argument applied to the graph references odd and even, but these terms can be avoided. 
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In general, on a structuralist understanding of mathematics, those explanations of 
physical facts that turn upon locating structural differences may be seen as being mathe-
matical, for on this conception to be a mathematical explanation is not itself to concern in-
dividual mathematical objects. Euler can be said to explain the impossibility of a continu-
ous walk over the Seven Bridges of Königsberg by bringing out those structural features of 
the associated graph that make a difference to the possibility of a continuous path, where 
the structural features that preclude a path through the graph are the structural features of 
the physical arrangement of the bridges that make a continuous walk impossible. Euler’s ar-
gument shows the common structure to be configured so that a walk is impossible, thus ex-
plaining why one cannot traverse the Seven Bridges of old Königsberg in a continuous path 
crossing each bridge only once. The graph functions here to make the mathematical struc-
ture apparent. Showing that mathematical objects are dispensable in formulating scien-
tific theories and explanations by giving an alternative that does not make reference to such 
objects isn’t to have shown that mathematics is dispensable. In particular, it isn’t to have 
shown that such explanations are non-mathematical. For on this view mathematics isn’t 
fundamentally about such objects, but about structures.10
An attractive feature of this position is that it fits well with the intuition that Field’s 
nominalized theories, which if successful remove reference to individual abstract mathe-
matical objects, do not seem to have removed the mathematics, for Field obtains correlates 
of many standard mathematical theorems employed in science, and intuitively they seem to 
be mathematical too. That is, it isn’t reference to abstract mathematical objects that makes 
a subject mathematical, but it is the description of the relations that hold between (hypoth-
esized) mathematical objects, which are captured by theorems, along with the methods of 
demonstration, that constitutes mathematics. Where those relations hold of physical ob-
jects and predicates that can be described using correlates of the ordinary theorems stated 
in terms of mathematical objects, the subject matter on this view remains mathematical.11 
In particular, this has the advantage that there is no discontinuity between the (abstracted) 
physical arrangements of islands and bridges considered by Jansson and Saatsi, and math-
ematical graphs. Although the graphs involve a greater degree of abstraction, the reasoning 
concerning the essential (mathematical) concepts is the same.
A structuralist view of mathematics has considerable promise to account for the rela-
tionship between pure and applied mathematics. Here, it makes good sense of the connec-
tion between the argument of Euler, which references the Seven Bridges graph, in arguing 
that there is no continuous path through the graph and the argument that references only 
the physical arrangement of landmasses and bridges. The former provides an explanatory 
proof of the fact of pure mathematics that there is no continuous path through the graph. 
Given that the proof exhibits the structural features that make such a path through the 
graph impossible, and the physical arrangement shares the structural features of the graph, 
the proof may be said to yield a mathematical explanation of the corresponding fact about 
the physical bridges, on a structuralist understanding of mathematics.
10 One notable feature here is that it captures the similarity between the argument within mathematics 
concerning the Seven Bridges graph and the argument concerning the physical arrangement. 
11 This differs from Field’s view according to which mathematics is about mathematical objects.
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There are many versions of mathematical structuralism, some of which assume a realist 
ontology of structures. Others adopt an antirealist version according to which mathematics 
concerns possible structures. The latter sort of position permits taking reference to possible 
mathematical structures to yield mathematical explanations of physical facts, without hav-
ing to accept mathematical objects.12 What is essential here is not so much whether pure 
mathematics concerns actual or possible structures, but that it is possible to take a fiction-
alist stance towards the mathematical objects that traditional mathematical realists accept, 
while accepting the relations between such hypothesized objects as objective mathemati-
cal truths. This in turn provides a way of allowing for mathematical explanations of physi-
cal facts without accepting mathematical objects. On this view mathematics may be seen as 
indeed playing an indispensable role in explaining physical facts, but as I have argued, even 
insofar as mathematics is considered to be supported through its role in the explanation of 
physical facts, this does not require accepting mathematical objects. As such, it may be said 
that there is a version of the indispensability argument highlighting the explanatory role of 
mathematics, but whose conclusion only requires the truth of mathematical statements, 
rather than the existence of mathematical objects, and which fits closely with Putnam’s un-
derstanding of the indispensability argument (Putnam 2012).
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